Using the comprehensive trading data for the U.S. corporate insiders between 1993 and 2008, we document robust evidence that insiders as a whole achieve transaction prices superior to the volume-weighted average prices. This outperformance, expressed as a positive trading alpha, remains after we control for trade di¢ culty, insider reputation and the corporate role ranks of insiders. Upon analyzing the time series patterns of portfolio returns to strategies of mimicking corporate insiders with abnormal trading alphas in the extreme quartiles, we conclude that the outperforming insiders at the aggregate level resemble value investors who act on long-term fundamental information, trade patiently and earn rents from providing liquidity. Moreover, outside investors bene…t from mimicking the acts of outperforming insiders in real time. The sizeable pro…t from this mimicking strategy withstands the erosion from adjustments for standard factors in the asset pricing literature and the adjustment for stock characteristics.
Introduction
Performance evaluation is critical to the function of any competitive business, and the question as to whether money managers are able to "beat the market"has long been controversial in the investment literature due to the debate over market e¢ ciency. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been little study examining a related question, i.e., whether or not traders outperform the market in terms of managing transaction costs. In this paper, we set out to evaluate the performance of U.S. corporate insiders in the context of transaction costs and uncover empirical evidence of insiders obtaining better than market average prices. Moreover, it appears quite pro…table for outside investors to identify those insiders who have superior trading performance and mimic their trades in real time.
As insiders place their orders, those transactions can potentially move the price in the direction of their orders, resulting in a price impact that can be interpreted as the deviation of the transaction price from the fundamental price in the absence of insider trades. To the extent that market makers interpret orders from insiders as motivated by value-relevant information, the insider trades coincide with a positive price impact. In this paper, we follow Berkowitz et al. (1988) and use the volume-weighted average prices (VWAP) on the trade day as the benchmark against which to compare insider transaction prices after carefully removing the e¤ect of insider trades from the benchmark. Hence, a negative price impact for an insider order (i.e., buy at a price lower than the VWAP or sell at a price higher than the VWAP) re ‡ects the price improvement that the insider obtains relative to the daily benchmark. For this reason, we label the price improvement as "trading alpha."
Using the comprehensive insider trading data in the U.S. between 1993 and 2008, we …nd that corporate insiders as a group have an average raw trading alpha of 4.2 cents for purchases and 3.6 cents for sales, both of which are reliably positive. The abnormal trading alpha amounts to around 10 cents per share for both insider purchases and sales, which is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level, after we control for trade di¢ culty, insider reputation and their corporate role ranks. We interpret this …nding as evidence of insiders beating the market in that they are indeed able to obtain favorable transaction prices relative to the volume-weighted average prices.
It is plausible to attribute the insider outperformance at the aggregate level to skill or style. The positive abnormal trading alpha can represent the trading skill of insiders or brokers in terms of delivering superior execution quality. Alternatively, it can also re ‡ect the investment style of insiders who earn liquidity rents from submitting passive orders. To run a horse race between these two interpretations though, it requires more detail than what the U.S. insider trading data would allow. For instance, it is necessary to track the identities of brokers hired by the insiders and di¤erentiate the investment styles among insiders and their brokers. The type of insider orders and the venue of insider trades can also a¤ect the transaction costs. Unfortunately, however, the existing regulations governing the insider trades do not mandate the disclosure of these details. Therefore, it is di¢ cult to directly test the skill interpretation against the style interpretation for the insider outperformance in managing transaction costs. This paper makes a novel contribution to the literature by indirectly disentangling the trading skill interpretation from the investment style interpretation through the time-series pattern of portfolio returns to strategies mimicking the insiders. The separation is possible here because the investment style interpretation hinges upon the distinction between shortlived information and long-term information whereas the trading skill interpretation makes no such distinction. Speci…cally, trading based on short-lived information is one de…ning characteristic of traders who consistently demand immediacy and thus incur negative abnormal trading alpha. In contrast, those who trade on long-term information would provide liquidity and enjoy positive abnormal trading alpha. To take advantage of this distinction, we extend the investment style argument in Keim and Madhavan (1997) and reach two empirical predictions. First, mimicking the actions of insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha should be pro…table in the short term but the long term pro…tability may attenuate or reverse. Second, mimicking the actions of insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha should be pro…table in the long term. In contrast to the predicted diverging pro…t patterns under the investment style interpretation, the trading skill interpretation predicts a lack of discernible pro…t pattern for the mimicking strategies because the trading skill has nothing to do with the information content of the trades or the life cycle of the underlying information.
Based on the U.S. corporate insider trades, we demonstrate evidence that mimicking the purchases of insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha delivers a pro…t that more than doubles the pro…t from mimicking the purchases of insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha for the …rst month following the portfolio formation. Over the twelve-month holding period, it pays o¤ to mimic those insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha. Mimicking those insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha, on the other hand, pays o¤ only in the short term and su¤ers attenuating pro…ts and even losses in the long term. Therefore, the pro…tability patterns of mimicking strategies in our sample are consistent with the two predictions under the investment style interpretation.
We interpret these …ndings as evidence in favor of the investment style interpretation rather than the trading skill interpretation.
Our paper is quite unique in that it naturally bridges the transaction costs literature with the insider trading literature on the foundation of di¤erences in investment style advocated by Keim and Madhavan (1997) . Our trading alpha metric certainly stems from the empirical literature on transaction costs. 1 A number of studies have utilized proprietary data to analyze 1 The empirical literature of transaction costs is voluminous. An incomplete list of some early work includes the di¤erent components of transaction costs for institutional investors. 2 This paper focuses on the price impact as one component of implicit costs for corporate insiders as opposed to institutional investors. It is well documented in the literature (e.g., Keim and Madhavan, 1998 ) that implicit costs dominate explicit costs in magnitude. The price impact is arguably the most important and measurable part of transaction costs in the context of insider trading. In fact, it is empirically infeasible to consider other components of costs for insider trades. 3 There are several unique advantages in focusing on corporate insiders as opposed to institutional investors. First, the insider trading data are directly obtained from the reports that insiders …le with the SEC and thus are more likely to be order-level data rather than trade-level data. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1998) stress the importance of setting the unit of observation at the order level and assess the price impact associated with the entire package of trades in each order as opposed to individual trades.
The insider trading data satisfy this requirement. Second, the insider trading data clearly mark the identity of traders per regulatory requirement and thus make it feasible to study the reputation track record that insiders accumulate over time in the context of transaction costs. Third, some studies use the prices or quotes around the transaction as the benchmark price to measure price impact, but the insider trading data lack the detailed time stamp within the day. Using the daily VWAP as the benchmark bypasses this problem. Moreover, the VWAP benchmark makes the trading alpha a natural barometer of whether traders beat the market. Finally, prior literature mainly uses proprietary data of institutional trades for a relative short time period when studying the transaction costs, whereas the insider trading data in this paper are publicly available for a longer period of time.
One contribution of this paper to the transaction costs literature is the new …nding that corporate insiders as a group are able to obtain favorable transaction prices. We are also able to further develop the investment style argument in Keim and Madhavan (1997) and hypothesize di¤erent time-series patterns of pro…tability between traders who exploit shortlived information and those that trade on long-term information. The U.S. corporate insider trading data support these predictions and provide corroborative evidence for the investment Beebower and Priest (1980) , Berkowitz et al. (1988) , Arnott and Wagner (1990) , Collins and Fabozzi (1991) and Wagner and Banks (1992) . Note that trading costs are usually decomposed into explicit costs and implicit costs. Given the lack of reporting for implicit costs, there is considerable disagreement in the literature over how to best measure implicit costs. There also are a number of recent studies that analyze the transaction costs for institutional investors, including Chan and Lakonishok (1995) , Keim and Madhavan (1997) on the buy side is pro…table over the short term but there is much weaker potential from imitating the insider sales. We further contribute to the literature by demonstrating that it is highly pro…table to mimic the group of insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha. Given monthly portfolio rebalancing, the long-short strategy generates an annualized return of 18.24% under the equal-weighting scheme (or 14.76% under the value-weighting scheme) and the pro…t remains positive and statistically signi…cant even after we adjust for standard models of factor pricing and after we use the characteristic-selectivity approach in Daniel et al. (1997) .
The balance of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology of constructing the primary variable of interest in this paper. In Section 3 we carry out the regression analysis of the trading alpha, controlling for trade di¢ culty, insider role ranks and reputation measures. Section 4 analyzes the pro…tability of trading strategies for outside investors to mimic insider trades in real time that pick stocks solely based on the insider abnormal trading alpha. We conclude in Section 5.
Data and Methodology

Insider Trades
Our primary data source is Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data Feed, which provides a historical archive for the transactions of persons subject to the disclosure requirements of required to report their trades within two business days. As is typically done in the insider trading literature, we focus on Form 4 data that provide the following information: the name and address of reporting person, issuer name and trading symbol of the security, relationship of reporting person to the issuer (o¢ cers, directors or other positions held by the reporting persons in issuers), whether it is a purchase or sale, transaction date, price and trade size in shares. 5 As documented in Appendix A of Jeng et al. (2003) , this database contains a number of data errors due to either reporting mistakes or data transcribing issues. We employ a number of …lters to mitigate the problem. For an insider trade to stay in our sample, the underlying stock must have data coverage by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), from which we obtain the time series of stock returns, market equity and other …rm characteristics.
We focus only on open market transactions of equity securities. The reported trades cannot have a transaction price outside the daily price range as recorded in CRSP on the trade day.
We further restrict that transaction prices fall between $5 and $500 and each transaction shall involve at least 100 shares but no more than the daily trading volume recorded in CRSP. period. These patterns speak to the growing importance of insider trades and motivate us to examine how well these insider trades were executed. Note that insider sales are much more prevalent than insider purchases during this period. Insider sales account for 86% of aggregate insider trades in terms of the number of trades. When measured in total share volume and total dollar volume, the fraction of insider sales of all insider transactions is 85% and 92%, respectively. The dominance of insider sales can be partially attributed to the increased use of stock option awards and grants that are designed to incentivize corporate insiders and align their interests with those of other shareholders. Corporate insiders often execute these option awards and grants, which are not part of our sample, and then sell their shares in the open market, which are part of our sample. As net sellers on average, the corporate insiders may also sell their company stocks for diversi…cation and liquidity purposes. 5 A sample SEC Form 4 can be obtained from www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4.pdf.
Trading Alpha
The transaction costs literature has provided numerous cost measures with varying areas of focus. The insider trading data make it possible to study the price impact, an implicit cost component of total transaction costs, but not other components. For instance, insiders are not compelled to disclose the explicit costs such as commissions and taxes paid when …ling reports with the SEC. We also rule out studying spread measures here due to the lack of precise time stamp for insider trades. Moreover, in the context of insider trading it is di¢ cult to measure the opportunity costs of execution failure (also known as implementation shortfall) because insiders disclose the date of trade but not the time when they …rst decided to trade. 6 Though the price impact represents an incomplete picture of total transaction costs, there is a consensus in the literature (e.g., Keim and Madhavan, 1998 ) that implicit costs dominate explicit costs.
To measure the price impact, the transaction prices can be compared to various benchmark prices in the existing literature. In this paper, we follow Berkowitz et al. (1988) and use the volume-weighted average prices (VWAP) as the benchmark. Over time the VWAP measure has become the standard benchmark for evaluating the execution quality of professional traders. 7 Using the daily VWAP as the benchmark, a negative price impact for an insider order (i.e., buy at a price lower than the VWAP or sell at a price higher than the VWAP) re‡ects the price improvement that the insider obtains relative to the daily benchmark. For this reason, we label the price improvement as "trading alpha." The trading alpha is analogous to the abnormal return in excess of the benchmark factors in investment performance evaluation that is known as "Jensen's alpha."A positive trading alpha can then be interpreted as evidence of traders beating the market average prices. It is useful to distinguish the implicit costs of insider purchases from those of insider sales so we construct two separate VWAP series. Speci…cally, we classify each trade from NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database into buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm that is standard in the literature. 8 All the prices for buyer-initiated trades are weighted by their respective size on a given day for a given stock, and the daily sum becomes the VWAP on the buy side. The VWAP on the sell side can be constructed in a similar way. 6 Perold (1988) popularizes the notion of implementation shortfall, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the market price at the decision time and the eventual transaction price. 7 Madhavan (2002) provides a survey about various versions of VWAP and their usefulness in trading strategies (also known as the VWAP strategies) and performance evaluation (the VWAP benchmark). Hu (2007) argues that the VWAP to trade execution essentially amounts to the market index return to investment performance. 8 Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm compares the trade price with the prevailing quote price. A trade is classi…ed as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trade if the trade price is greater than (less than) the mid-point of the prevailing quote. For trades that have a transaction price identical to the mid-point of prevailing quote price, the tick test is used. That is, a trade is a buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) trade if the trade price goes up (down) from the last trade. Trades are not classi…ed and discarded if the trade price doesn't change from the last trade.
Having outlined the procedure to calculate the VWAP, we de…ne the trading alpha as
where isbuy is an indicator taking the value of 1 for insider purchases and 0 otherwise; and tprice is the reported transaction price of insider trades. Even though the trading alpha is de…ned as the price di¤erential in dollars throughout the paper, we also carry out all the analyses expressing the trading alpha as a percentage of the transaction price. The qualitative nature of the results under the alternative speci…cation remains unaltered so we report only the results with trading alpha in dollars to conserve space.
Our trading alpha measure di¤ers from the implicit cost measure in Keim and Madhavan (1998) . For buyer-initiated orders, they compute the ratio of the volume-weighted average prices of various component trades in each order to the closing price on the day before the trade decision, and de…ne the implicit cost as the ratio in excess of 1. The implicit trade cost for a seller-initiated order carries an opposite sign to this price change. The main di¤erence between our trading alpha and their implicit cost measure is the choice of the benchmark price. Keim and Madhavan (1998) use the closing price on the day before the trade decision as the benchmark price whereas we use the VWAP in the same day as our benchmark price.
This di¤erence in design mainly stems from the di¤erence in research goals. Since we are more interested in whether insiders as a whole can beat the market average prices when they trade and are less concerned with the true decision price for insiders, the VWAP is a more appropriate benchmark than the closing price on the previous day.
One problem with using the VWAP as a benchmark is that the construction of VWAP series includes the insiders'own trades. Hu (2009) discusses the bias in VWAP when traders' own trades are not excluded. This bias turns out to be a function of traders' own trades as a fraction of the total trading volume, and thus it can be substantial for traders that dominate the volume in certain stocks. Given that insider trading volume in many cases is a signi…cant portion of the total trading volume, it is important to address this bias. We adopt the approach in Hu (2009) to correct this bias in two steps. First, we divide the volume of insider trades by the daily trading volume to obtain the fraction of insider trades, denoted by f in Hu (2009). We then calculate the revised VWAP by multiplying the untreated VWAP by the adjustment factor of 1=(1 f ). Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the trading alpha separately for insider purchases and sales. Panel A shows that on average insiders achieve a trading alpha of 4.2 (3.6) cents when they buy (sell). In our sample, there are both insiders who get prices inferior to the VWAP and insiders who get prices superior to the VWAP, but the latter group dominates at the aggregate level. The median of raw trading alpha is 2 cents for both insider purchases and sales. Both the means and medians are statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. We have purged all observations with raw trading alpha beyond the tail 1% on both ends to mitigate the concern about outliers. To assess the economic signi…cance of the raw trading alpha, note that insiders have sold more than 15 billion shares over the sample period. An average raw trading alpha of 3.6 cents for insider sales easily translates to the cost savings of 54 million dollars in total, which is a sizeable sum.
In one robustness check, we slice the full sample into four sub-samples, with four years apiece, and report the summary statistics in Panels B through E. The basic conclusion of a positive and signi…cant raw trading alpha for both insider purchases and sales holds for each sub-sample. A few time-series patterns emerge from the sub-period analysis. It is clear that the insider trades have gone up substantially over time both for purchases and sales. What is also apparent is the fact that insiders have higher raw trading alpha in the …rst half of the sample than in the second half. The declining raw trading alpha in the second half coincides with the period following the decimalization in the U.S. stock markets in 2001, after which the equity transaction costs have come down sharply. Even though in the full sample insider purchases are associated with higher raw trading alpha than insider sales, this is not always the case in sub-samples.
Taken together, Table 3 suggests that on average insiders achieve positive trading alpha on both purchases and sales of stocks. This trading alpha is both economically and statistically signi…cant. A series of questions arises naturally. What are the main determinants of trading alpha? Can this positive trading alpha be explained away by trade di¢ culty and insider characteristics? In the next section, we attempt to address these and other questions.
Regression Analysis of Trading Alpha
Transaction costs can certainly be related to the complexity of the trading environment, so it is important to examine if the insider trading alpha is solely determined by trade di¢ culty.
We start with a few well-established basic measures of trade di¢ culty and then use extended measures of trade di¢ culty. To further explain the cross-sectional and time-series variation of the trading alpha adjusted for trade di¢ culty, we allow for a number of insider characteristics that are measurable and have available data.
Basic Model of Trade Di¢ culty
It has long been recognized that transaction costs are directly related to the di¢ culty of executing a trade. As is typically done in the literature, we run a multivariate regression with a few basic proxies for trade di¢ culty,
Among the explanatory variables, shares denotes the insider choice of share volume, mktcap stands for the logarithmic market equity of the …rm with which the insider is a¢ liated, and tprice is the transaction price that the insider obtains. All variables are measured contemporaneously except the market equity in the preceding month.
The intercept 0 captures the average abnormal trading alpha after adjusting for trade di¢ culty. Larger orders should imply a higher price impact and thus a lower trading alpha, so we expect 1 to be less than zero. The market capitalization is included as a proxy for liquidity, and its e¤ect on trading alpha depends on the trader's role. Providing liquidity in a small and thus illiquid stock can be costly, so the liquidity provider would demand a high rent (i.e., a positive trading alpha), resulting in a negative relationship between the market capitalization and the trading alpha. Similarly, demanding liquidity in a small stock requires high payment (i.e., a negative trading alpha), and thus we expect a positive relationship between the market capitalization and the trading alpha. In short, we hypothesize 2 to be less than zero among traders who supply liquidity and 2 to be greater than zero among those who demand liquidity. The share price is included because the dependent variable is measured as a price di¤erential (i.e., improvement over the volume-weighted average price) and thus can be proportional to the share price. For similar reasons, Goldstein et al. (2009) include the share price as a determinant for commission per share, and other studies include the reciprocal of share price as a determinant of transaction costs when transaction costs are measured as a percentage of price. 9 We expect a positive 3 among liquidity suppliers and a negative 3 among liquidity demanders.
We carry out the regression analysis using both the pooling regression and Fama-MacBeth regression methods and opt to report the more conservative results from the latter approach.
Speci…cally, we estimate the regression for each month between 1993 and 2008 using the entire cross-section of corporate insider trades in the U.S. The time series averages of parameter estimates are then used to gauge the statistical signi…cance of the explanatory variables as well as the intercept. Note that the insider purchases are estimated separately from the insider sales. In addition to the regression using all purchases or sales, we also estimate the regression for records with positive trading alpha separately from the regression for those with negative trading alpha. The separation by the sign of trading alpha is designed to capture possible di¤erences related to the insider role in the process of liquidity provision. For ease of interpretation, we label insiders with a positive trading alpha as "liquidity suppliers" and insiders with a negative trading alpha "liquidity demanders." Table 4 presents the regression results for the model with basic measures of trade di¢ culty.
All the predicted signs are supported by estimates that are statistically signi…cant while the 9 We have also carried out all the analysis using a measure of trading alpha de…ned as the price improvement relative to the daily VWAP as a percentage of the transaction price. The results based on trading alpha in dollars remain qualitatively the same as the results based on trading alpha in percentage. For brevity we report only the former set of results.
estimated coe¢ cients with a wrong sign are invariably insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. The share price is strongly signi…cant with the predicted sign in all six regressions. The …rm size is nearly as strong a predictor, with the only exception being the regression among liquidity demanders. The insider choice of share volume is rather weak especially when explaining the trading alpha among insider purchases. Interestingly, insiders who are perceived to be providing liquidity enjoy the average rent of about 36 cents per share on purchases and 44 cents per share on sales, while those demanding liquidity incur the average payment of about 3 cents per share on purchases and 22 cents per share on sales, after adjusting for rudimentary measures of trade di¢ culty.
Given the dominance of records with positive trading alpha in this sample, we …nd an average alpha of about 20 cents per share among purchases and 11 cents per share among sales after controlling for trade di¢ culty when all insider trades are estimated jointly without distinguishing the sign of trading alpha. The evidence in this sample indicates that insiders act as liquidity providers on average and earn rents accordingly. This result supports the …nding in Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and Keim and Madhavan (1997) that value investors incur a negative price impact in their sales. Not surprisingly, the estimated coe¢ cients under the joint estimation carry the same set of signs as in the regression among liquidity providers.
The adjusted R 2 under the joint estimation is dramatically lower than the two regressions separated by the sign of the raw trading alpha, re ‡ecting the general di¢ culty with disentangling orders that demand liquidity from those that provide liquidity ex ante, and the complexity with identifying proxies for trade di¢ culty with readily available data. Nevertheless, the relatively low adjusted R 2 under the joint estimation is not unique to our sample and in fact is often present in the literature concerning the transaction costs of institutional investors.
Extended Model of Trade Di¢ culty
Having presented the results for a basic model of trade di¢ culty, we now expand the group of proxies for trade di¢ culty to include daily stock return, stock volatility (measured as the absolute daily return on the trade day) as well as an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and takes the value of 0 otherwise. The expanded regression design is
From the perspective of a trader, it is more di¢ cult to execute a buy (or sell) order on a day coinciding with a positive (or negative) return. Similarly, a stock with a higher level of volatility or a stock that is listed in an exchange other than the NYSE is often considered to exist in a more di¢ cult trading environment. In such instances, liquidity providers would charge more rents while those who demand liquidity have to pay more rents. In other words, we expect positive 4 among purchases from insiders who provide liquidity and sales from insiders who demand liquidity. A negative 4 should apply among purchases from insiders who demand liquidity and sales from insiders who provide liquidity. We also expect positive 5 and negative 6 among liquidity suppliers and the opposite signs among liquidity demanders.
Given the dominant presence of insiders who are perceived to provide liquidity in this sample, the expected pattern of signs for the regression using all insider trades is: 1 < 0, 2 < 0, 3 > 0, 5 > 0 and 6 < 0 for both insider purchases and sales; 4 > 0 for insider purchases and 4 < 0 for insider sales.
We slice the sample into four pieces based on the insider role of liquidity provision and the trade initiation. Three important determinants for trading alpha emerge from the results in Table 5 for the extended model. The share price, the stock volatility and the indicator for NYSE have the predicted signs with strong statistical signi…cance in all four sub-samples.
Their in ‡uence on the transaction outcomes is very intuitive. Stocks with higher prices require higher liquidity rents in dollar, as would stocks with higher volatility. The distinction of market design is also important in that NYSE stocks appear to be associated with a lower liquidity rent. The other three measures of trade di¢ culty are weaker determinants for trading alpha, especially in the case of insider purchases and insiders who demand liquidity.
While it is useful to distinguish the insiders with positive raw trading alpha from those with negative alpha so as to capture the intuition behind the insider role in the liquidity provision process, this exercise can only be done ex post and it remains di¢ cult to predict ex ante which orders would demand liquidity as opposed to supply liquidity. For this reason, in the remaining analysis we focus on the regressions with all insider purchases or sales regardless of the sign of the raw trading alpha. In the last set of columns in Table 5 asymmetry by linking the contemporaneous market condition to the price impact. They argue that liquidity suppliers charge higher rents for momentum orders (i.e., buy orders during a bullish market and sell orders during a bearish market) than contrarian orders (i.e., sell orders during a bullish market and buy orders during a bearish market). When using all insider trades, Table 5 shows a positive contemporaneous relationship between return and trading alpha among insider purchases and a negative one among insider sales. In other words, we witness positive 4 for insider purchases and negative 4 for insider sales just as predicted. This is direct evidence con…rming the intuition in Chiyachantana et al. (2004) , even though insiders appear to earn rents from providing liquidity on average in this sample whereas institutional investors pay for demanding immediacy in their sample.
Compared to the base model of trade di¢ culty, the model with extended measures experiences substantial improvement in goodness of …t as measured by the markedly higher adjusted R 2 . The estimated intercept, or the di¢ culty-adjusted trading alpha, averages about 10 cents for both insider purchases and sales, each of which is reliably di¤erent from zero. Again, there is evidence that insiders indeed beat the market on average and obtain a more favorable price than the volume-weighted average price even after controlling for trade di¢ culty.
Role of Insider Characteristics
The estimated model for trade di¢ culty helps to generate a time series, AdjAlpha, as the sum of the estimated common intercept in each month and the transaction-level residual. This series captures the portion of trading alpha that remains unexplained by various proxies for trade di¢ culty. To examine whether insider characteristics are able to explain the variations in di¢ culty-adjusted trading alpha, we run the following regression,
The insider trading data provide the role rank of insiders within their respective corporations, so we cast insiders into one of three categories: top executives, o¢ cers/directors and others. The dummy variable isexecutive takes the value of 1 for top executives and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the dummy variable iso¢ cer takes the value of 1 for o¢ cers or directors and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable is…nexecutive takes the value of 1 for executives in the …nancial industry and 0 otherwise. While the insider trading literature has explored the implications of the information hierarchy on stock prices (e.g., Seyhun, 1986), we have no speci…c prior on how the insider role ranks might a¤ect the trading alpha. The sign of the estimated coe¢ cients for these dummy variables would reveal the trading performance of their respective group relative to all insiders that are non-executives and non-o¢ cers, which are presumably dominated by block holders.
Before discussing measures of reputation as part of the explanatory variables, we …rst recall the rather intuitive reputation hypothesis in Seppi (1990) . Namely, traders who can credibly signal that their orders are liquidity motivated should incur little price impact by trading large blocks in the "upstairs market" where a block broker facilitates the trading by locating counterparties. This would in turn help these traders save transaction costs associated with a large price impact from the alternative strategy of placing a sequence of small trades in the "downstairs market." Madhavan and Cheng (1997) To test the reputation hypothesis, we design two proxies of insider reputation. For each insider we compute the daily volume-weighted trading alpha adjusted for trade di¢ culty, AdjAlpha. The …rst reputation measure for a given insider is the adjusted trading alpha for the same insider in the preceding day, which can be days or even months earlier depending on how frequently the insider trades. The rationale behind this measure is that an insider known for having provided liquidity before is likely to continue providing liquidity in the future. The second reputation measure builds on this idea and tallies the cumulative average adjusted trading alpha up to the trade day concerned. The reputation hypothesis posits that each of these reputation measures should be positively related to the trading alpha adjusted for trade di¢ culty, so we expect positive 4 .
Based on regression results in Table 6 concerning various combinations of dummies for insider role ranks and reputation measures, there is clear evidence supporting the reputation hypothesis. Regardless of whether we use the short-term liquidity rent (or payment) or the long-term cumulative track record of liquidity rent (or payment), the insider reputation is positively related to the adjusted trading alpha and this positive association is strongly statistically signi…cant. Those insiders who have earned liquidity rents in the past continue to earn positive adjusted trading alpha, and this pattern holds for both insider purchases and sales. In essence this insider reputation e¤ect speaks to the persistence of adjusted trading alpha over time. As far as the role rank of corporate insiders is concerned, top executives appear to have lower adjusted trading alpha and there is little distinction between o¢ cers/directors and those non-executive-non-o¢ cer insiders. This pattern of results seems stronger among insider purchases rather than insider sales. One interpretation for this result is that corporate executives are less likely to credibly signal the lack of information motivation behind their orders. All else being equal, top executives in the …nancial industry enjoy higher adjusted trading alpha, likely re ‡ecting the increased sophistication of these executives about …nancial transactions in general compared to insiders in other industries.
The evidence in this paper directly supporting the reputation hypothesis in Seppi (1990) marks an important contribution to the literature because it deepens our understanding of the repeated interactions among traders as they inevitably in ‡uence the transaction outcomes.
The …nding here also opens a new window to the analysis of insider trades. Note however that there is still a large portion of variation for the abnormal trading alpha that cannot be explained by the insider characteristics for which we have available data. The average abnormal trading alpha, after controlling for trade di¢ culty and insider characteristics, is about 10 cents per share for both insider purchases and sales and is reliably di¤erent from zero.
Strategies on Abnormal Trading Alpha
Even though we have shown extensive evidence for the existence of positive abnormal trading alpha after adjusting for trade di¢ culty and insider-speci…c factors, we have not settled on the true source of the insider abnormal trading alpha. The positive abnormal trading alpha can be either a proxy for the trading skill of insiders or brokers in terms of delivering outstanding execution quality, or a measure of investment style much in the same way as value investors are able to earn liquidity rents. To shed light on the underlying source of insider outperformance, we allow outside investors to ride the coattail of insiders and evaluate the pro…tability of these mimicking strategies over time.
Sources of Insider Outperformance
The literature has documented supporting evidence that brokers play an important role in determining the execution costs for institutional traders. For instance, Conrad et al. (2009) …nd that brokers exhibit signi…cant heterogeneity in execution quality and that at least some brokers can deliver consistently better execution over time. Top brokers in their sample appear able to sustain their advantage over adjacent periods. They also show that institutional investors exert discretion in selecting brokers; that is, an institution's choice of a broker is sensitive to past execution performance. Taken together, there is evidence that brokers potentially play a role in contributing to the positive abnormal trading alpha.
The insider outperformance can also be related to the speci…c trading system used by insiders or their brokers. Conrad et al. (2003) show that in general lower trading costs can be achieved on alternative trading systems as compared to the costs of using traditional brokers. It is also possible that insider choices of trading venues contribute to their superior trading performance. Another source of the insider outperformance might be related to the commissions paid by insiders. While Berkowitz et al. (1988) …nd that there is no substitution between commissions and implicit trading costs, Keim and Madhavan (1997) …nd that there exists a positive correlation between implicit and explicit costs. In other words, the explicit and implicit costs might be jointly determined. 10 We cannot rule out the possibility that insiders are paying very high commissions to their brokers and they are rewarded with superior trading performance in return.
Instead of attributing the outperformance to external factors such as broker skills, trading venue and broker commissions, Keim and Madhavan (1997) champion the notion that the investment style and order submission strategy complement trade di¢ culty in determining the transaction costs for institutional investors. They …nd that index managers and technical managers indeed incur higher total transaction costs than fundamental value managers, re ‡ecting the idea that the former group of institutional investors is more likely to demand immediacy than the latter group. Roze¤ and Zaman (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) document evidence that insiders are contrarian investors at the aggregate level. Thus one natural implication of this evidence is that those contrarian insiders supply liquidity at the time when liquidity rents are high, and thus should be able to achieve substantial savings on transaction costs. From this perspective, it is not surprising that insiders command a positive trading alpha on average before the contrarian strategy is taken into account. This …nding is certainly consistent with the investment style argument in Keim and Madhavan (1997) . Given the fact that insiders still deliver a positive trading alpha even after we control for their contrarian strategy through the inclusion of the same day return in addition to other measures of trade di¢ culty, it remains a challenge in how to best interpret the insider outperformance.
There is an active debate in the investment literature on whether a positive investment alpha should be attributed to the managerial skills and stock picking abilities of mutual fund managers, or attributed to the investment style that managers follow. Likewise, the advocates of the skill interpretation in the context of trading performance would credit the positive abnormal trading alpha to the skillfulness of insiders or their brokers in terms of delivering superior execution quality rather than to the investment style as emphasized by Keim and Madhavan (1997) . To tease out which interpretation is favored by the data, we need to account for di¤erences in investment style among insiders and their brokers. The trading aggressiveness of insiders or their brokers as well as the particular order types and trading venues used by insiders certainly can a¤ect the outcome of transaction costs. Unfortunately, however, the insiders are not required to provide such information when …ling the reports with the SEC. In the absence of such detailed data, it is di¢ cult to directly disentangle the skill interpretation from the style interpretation.
Separating Skill from Style
We now turn to the strategies of outside investors mimicking the insider trades in real time because the time series pattern of portfolio returns to such strategies can provide indirect evidence as to whether the skill interpretation or the style interpretation is better favored by the insider trading data. The gist of the trading strategy is to pick stocks based on the abnormal trading alpha of insiders. Before getting into the details of mimicking strategy, we need to develop a set of testable hypotheses that would help us distinguish the trading skill interpretation from the investment style interpretation for the insider outperformance.
According to Keim and Madhavan (1997) In essence, the pro…tability analysis of a long-short trading strategy to mimic insiders sheds light on the true source of the abnormal trading alpha. This is possible because the investment style interpretation hinges upon the distinction between short-lived information and long-term information whereas the trading skill interpretation makes no such distinction.
Forecasting Stock Returns
We form and rebalance the mimicking portfolios at the end of each calendar month. The vast majority of insider trades in our sample were reported to the SEC on the day of trade.
Given the timely disclosure of insider trades, it should be feasible for outside investors to observe the insider trades by the end of each month and form the mimicking portfolio in time. Carving out the part related to trade di¢ culty of the raw trading alpha, we are left with the adjusted trading alpha. For each corporate insider, we compute the volume-weighted daily adjusted trading alpha and then take the simple average for each month as the basis for ranking insiders within the month. The entire cross-section of insiders who traded in a given month is then sorted into four quartiles based on the level of insider abnormal trading alpha, and we assign the values for a set of four dummy variables indicating the presence of insiders of a certain type, or the lack thereof, for each …rm month. Speci…cally, the dummy variable ishighbuy (or ishighsell) indicates the presence of any insider whose buy (or sell) order is associated with a positive abnormal trading alpha in the top quartile; the dummy variable islowbuy (or islowsell) indicates the presence of any insider whose buy (or sell) order is associated with a negative abnormal trading alpha in the bottom quartile. This exercise of sorting and ranking is done separately for insider purchases and sales.
Before describing our strategy of stock selection based on these four dummy variables,
it is necessary to demonstrate that they are legitimate sorting devices to form a trading strategy. For this purpose, we run a set of regressions using the stock-speci…c monthly dummy variables, in conjunction with the logarithmic market equity mktcap and the bookto-market ratio bmratio in the preceding month as well as the last-twelve-month return ltmret over month t 12 and t 1, to predict the one-month-ahead stock returns. That is, return t+1 = 0 + 1 ishighbuy t + 2 islowbuy t + 3 ishighsell t + 4 islowsell t + 5 mktcap t + 6 bmratio t + 7 ltmret t + : Table 7 
Pro…tability Pattern of Mimicking Strategies
To empirically test two earlier predictions regarding the time-series pattern of pro…tability for the investment style hypothesis, we form two trading strategies at the end of each month.
The HBS strategy focuses on the actions of insiders who have positive abnormal trading alpha within the top quartile, buys stocks that these insiders bought and sells stocks that they sold earlier in the month. The LBS strategy focuses on the actions of insiders who have negative abnormal trading alpha within the bottom quartile, buys stocks that these insiders bought and sells stocks that they sold. The investment on the buy side is worth $1, as is the investment on the sell side. To mitigate noise arising from the rare occurrence of con ‡icting signals from di¤erent insiders from the same …rm that traded in the same month, we exclude …rm months in which there are both purchases and sales for the same stock from di¤erent insiders with abnormal trading alpha within the extreme quartiles. 11 After the formation month, each portfolio is held for the next twelve-month period either with equal-weighting or value-weighting scheme and we calculate the cumulative portfolio return. This exercise is repeated at the end of each month, and the time-series averages of cumulative portfolio returns are plotted in Figure 1 .
Under the equal-weighting scheme, the HBS strategy delivers a series of cumulative returns that is steadily increasing from 1.52% at the …rst month to 4.09% by the twelfth month of the holding period. Using the same weighting scheme, the cumulative return to the LBS strategy starts at 0.87% at the …rst month, drops by more than half by the seventh month and reaches 0.17% by the twelfth month of the holding period. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the contrast between these two strategies, which is consistent with the two predictions under the investment style hypothesis. Under the value-weighting scheme, a similar pattern holds. The HBS strategy yields 1.23% at the …rst month and delivers a cumulative return of 1.84% by the twelfth month of the holding period. The LBS strategy yields 0.40% at the …rst month and -0.23% by the twelfth month of the holding period. A graphic depiction of the contrast between these two strategies in the right panel of Figure 1 makes it clear again that it is rewarding to mimic those insiders who outperform in transaction costs both in the short term and in the long term. Mimicking those insiders with underperformance, on the other hand, pays o¤ only in the short term and su¤ers attenuating pro…ts and eventual losses in the long term. Therefore, the pro…tability pattern of mimicking strategies in our sample is consistent with both predictions under the investment style hypothesis. The insider trading data strongly favor the investment style interpretation as in Keim and Madhavan (1997) rather than the trading skill interpretation.
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence in this paper thus far leads us to three main conclusions. First, insiders are able to beat the market on average and obtain transaction prices that are about 10 cents per share better than volume-weighted average prices even after adjusting for trade di¢ culty, insider reputation and their role ranks. Second, the level of insider abnormal trading alpha appears to be more of a proxy for the investment style of insiders than a proxy for the trading skill. Insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha resemble value investors who base their decisions on long-term …rm fundamentals, trade less aggressively and earn rents from providing liquidity. In contrast, insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha resemble those investors who base their decisions on shortlived information, trade more aggressively and pay for demanding immediacy. Finally, those liquidity-providing insiders dominate other insiders who demand immediacy in this sample, and it is pro…table for outside investors to mimic the actions of insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha.
Performance Evaluation of Mimicking Strategies
It appears quite bene…cial for outside investors to mimic the trading decisions of insiders after separating insiders on the basis of transaction cost analysis. Suppose that outside investors commit to holding each mimicking portfolio for exactly one month and rebalancing the portfolio every month. The HBS strategy follows insiders who have extremely positive abnormal trading alpha and delivers an annualized portfolio raw return of 18.24% under the equal-weighting scheme (or 14.76% under the value-weighting scheme). The LBS strategy follows insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha and yields an annualized portfolio raw return of 10.44% under the equal-weighting scheme (or 4.80% under the valueweighting scheme). The large magnitude of raw returns prompts us to examine whether the outsize return is due to compensation for exposure to common risk factors. We employ a number of standard factor-pricing models to explain the time series variation of raw portfolio returns to both strategies, including the classic Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Fama- we cast all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks (with share code 10 or 11) into 125 bins 1 2 The stock characteristics are constructed as follows. We extract various data items from the annual fundamentals Compustat …le and construct the book equity using the de…nition by Fama and French. Following the Fama and French convention, we allow an accounting disclosure delay of at least six months. That is, the book equity knowable at the end of calendar year is applied to July of year + 1 through June of year + 2. Using the market equity in the preceding month, we are able to construct the monthly series of book-to-market ratio. The market equity in the preceding month is also a measure of …rm size in the current month. The trailing-twelve-month return for month t is de…ned as the cumulative stock return over month t 12 through t 1.
in each month. The classi…cation of the monthly stock bins is the result of creating …ve groups by each sorting variable, namely the …rm size, book-to-market ratio and trailing-twelvemonth return, and in that order. The determination of …ve-group cuto¤s relies on NYSE common stocks for the …rm size and book-to-market ratio, while the cuto¤s for the trailingtwelve-month return utilize all common stocks. For any given month, we compute both the equal-weighted and value-weighted returns separately for the 125 portfolios as benchmark returns. Each stock in the mimicking portfolio corresponds to one respective bin among the 125 benchmark bins, and we calculate the return di¤erential between the stock return and its benchmark portfolio return. The CS measure is the equal-or value-weighted portfolio return di¤erentials. Table 8 reports the results of performance evaluation using both the factor-pricing models and the CS measure. Regardless of whether we use the equal-weighting or value-weighting scheme, none of the …ve factor-pricing models is able to make a signi…cant dent on the portfolio return to the HBS strategy. All the estimated intercepts, also known as Jensen's alpha, are fairly close to the raw portfolio returns in magnitude and remain statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. The CS measure delivers a very similar pattern. Note that in the predictive regression for the one-month-ahead return the dummy variable for the presence of corporate insiders with extremely high trading alpha is positive and statistically signi…cant even after the inclusion of …rm size, book-to-market ratio and last-twelve-month return as control variables. Thus it is not surprising that the characteristic-selectivity measure based on the same set of …rm-speci…c factors turns out to be positive and signi…cant. As for the LBS strategy, time-series regressions using …ve factor-pricing models produce intercepts fairly close to the raw portfolio returns. Moreover, the estimated intercepts are all statistically signi…cant when we use the equal-weighting scheme. The CS measure once again delivers results closely resembling the regression intercepts. Although the estimated intercepts and the CS measure under the value-weighting scheme are mostly indistinguishable from zero from the statistical point of view, this is not surprising given that the value-weighted raw portfolio return to the LBS strategy is fairly close to zero to begin with.
Overall the standard factor-pricing models do not fully explain the pro…ts to the strategies of mimicking insiders with extreme abnormal trading alpha, and this pro…tability is also robust to adjusting for characteristics selectivity.
Conclusion
In recent years the corporate insiders in the U.S. have reported transactions at a skyrocketing rate. It becomes increasingly important for market participants, including academics, practitioners and regulators, to glean insights from parsing the insider trades. Examining the insider trading data between 1993 and 2008 in the U.S. from the transaction costs point of view, we present evidence that corporate insiders as a group obtain transaction prices superior to the volume-weighted average prices for the same stock on the same day, i.e., beating the market. For both insider purchases and sales, there exists a positive and signi…cant abnormal trading alpha of about 10 cents per share on average after adjusting for trade di¢ culty, insider reputation and the corporate role ranks of insiders.
Outside investors can focus on the insider abnormal trading alpha when designing a longshort strategy to mimic certain groups of insiders. The HBS strategy aims at replicating the trades of outperforming insiders while the LBS strategy targets those underperforming insiders. The time-series patterns of portfolio returns to these strategies yield clues to the source of insider performance in terms of managing transaction costs. We …nd evidence that the HBS strategy delivers a pro…t that continues to grow during the 12-month holding period while the pro…t to the LBS strategy attenuates over time and can turn into a loss by the twelfth month of the holding period. In other words, insiders with extremely negative abnormal trading alpha essentially trade on short-lived information in a rather aggressive fashion as re ‡ected in the eventual attenuation or reversal of pro…t and the higher transaction costs that they pay. In contrast, insiders with extremely positive abnormal trading alpha seem to resemble value investors that patiently trade on long-term fundamental information and earn rents from providing liquidity. The documented pro…t pattern for these two mimicking strategies, therefore, is consistent with the notion that the insider abnormal trading alpha re ‡ects the investment style of insiders, echoing the key …nding in Keim and Madhavan (1997) for institutional investors.
This paper contributes to the extant literature in several important aspects. First, it documents extensive evidence for the superior trading performance of the corporate insiders in the U.S. at the aggregate level. Second, the trading strategies in this paper are di¤erent from conventional strategies based on trading-intensity rules in that our strategies have the micro-foundation of the transaction costs analysis. Therefore, this paper uniquely bridges together the transaction costs literature and the insider trading literature. Moreover, this paper's extension to the investment style hypothesis in Keim and Madhavan (1997) While limitations in the insider trading data prevent us from explicitly separating the role of brokers from the role of insiders, it would be interesting to examine whether our results extend to a setting where we can measure the relative contribution of brokers to the management of transaction costs. It will also be interesting to study how the timing of corporate events (such as announcements of earnings and mergers and acquisitions) is related to the pro…tability of outsider strategies mimicking insider trades. We leave this and other empirical topics for future research. This table presents the summary statistics of trading alpha separately for insider purchases and insider sales of stocks. To compute the trading alpha, we …rst …nd the stock-speci…c daily volume-weighted average price (VWAP) based on consolidated trades in the New York Stock Exchange Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database. For insider buys, the trading alpha is de…ned as the VWAP in excess of the reported insider transaction prices. For insider sales, the trading alpha is de…ned as the reported insider transaction prices net of the VWAP. Panel A provides the summary statistics for the full sample while Panels B through E provide the summary statistics for four sub-sample periods. 
Num of Obs Mean Median
The dependent variable TrdAlpha for insider purchases and sales is de…ned in Section 2 of the main text. Among the explanatory variables, shares denotes the insider choice of share volume, mktcap stands for the logarithmic market equity of …rm with which the insider is a¢ liated, and tprice is the transaction price that the insider obtains. All variables are measured contemporaneously except the market equity in the preceding month. The regressions are estimated and reported separately for di¤erent sub-samples, depending on the trade initiation (purchases versus sales) and the sign of the dependent variable. Insiders with a positive trading alpha are labelled as "liquidity suppliers"and those with a negative trading alpha are labelled as "liquidity demanders." Inside parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by , and , respectively. The dependent variable TrdAlpha for insider purchases and sales is de…ned in Section 2 of the main text. Among the explanatory variables, shares denotes the insider choice of share volume, mktcap stands for the logarithmic market equity of …rm with which the insider is a¢ liated, tprice is the transaction price that the insider obtains, return is the daily stock return, volatility is the absolute value of daily stock return, and isnyse is an indicator for stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. All variables are measured contemporaneously except the market equity in the preceding month. The regressions are estimated and reported separately for di¤erent sub-samples, depending on the trade initiation (purchases versus sales) and the sign of the dependent variable. Insiders with a positive trading alpha are labelled as "liquidity suppliers" and those with a negative trading alpha are labelled as "liquidity demanders." Inside parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by , and , respectively. The dependent variable is the stock return in month t + 1. Among the explanatory variables measured in month t, the dummy variable ishighbuy (or ishighsell ) indicates the presence of any insider whose buy (or sell) order is associated with a positive abnormal trading alpha in the top quartile, the dummy variable islowbuy (or islowsell ) indicates the presence of any insider whose buy (or sell) order is associated with a negative abnormal trading alpha in the bottom quartile, mktcap is the logarithmic market equity of …rms with which insiders are a¢ liated, bmratio is the book-to-market ratio and ltmret is the last-twelve-month cumulative return between month t 12 and t 1. Inside parentheses are t-statistics. Statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by , and , respectively.
(1) Table 8 .
Performance Evaluation of Mimicking Strategies
This table presents selected results from using various factor-pricing models to explain the portfolio returns to strategies based on abnormal trading alpha. The HBS strategy mimics the actions of insiders who have positive abnormal trading alpha within the top quartile, and the LBS strategy mimics the actions of insiders who have negative abnormal trading alpha within the bottom quartile. The portfolio is formed at the end of each month, held for one month, and rebalanced at the end of each month. The monthly portfolio returns under the equal-weighting (or value-weighting) scheme are denoted by ewretHBS and ewretLBS (or vwretHBS and vwretLBS ). We report the estimated intercepts from the time series regressions of portfolio returns using a number of standard factor-pricing models, which include the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor model, the Carhart four-factor model, the Carhart four-factor model augmented by two liquidity factors in Sadka (2006) , and the Carhart four-factor model augmented by the liquidity factor in Pastor-Stambaugh (2003). We also report the time series average portfolio returns adjusted for …rm-speci…c factors such as size, book-to-market ratio and last-twelve-month return using the characteristic-selectivity (CS) measure in Daniel et al. (1997) . Inside parentheses are t-statistics.
Statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level is denoted by , and , respectively. This …gure plots the cumulative portfolio returns to two strategies of picking stocks based on the insider abnormal trading alpha. The HBS strategy mimics the actions of insiders who have positive abnormal trading alpha within the top quartile, while the LBS strategy mimics the actions of insiders who have negative abnormal trading alpha within the bottom quartile. The investment on the buy side is worth $1, as is the investment on the sell side. After the formation month, each portfolio is held for the next twelve-month period with equal-weighting (or value-weighting) scheme and we calculate the cumulative portfolio return for each strategy. This exercise is repeated at the end of each month, and we plot below the time-series averages of cumulative portfolio returns. 
